Few minorities pursue Erie County offices

Her political signs aren't much different from the many others popping up on lawns all across Erie County in recent weeks.
Andy Ouriel
Oct 27, 2012

It's a classy blue font on a white background: "Elect Beverly Hancock Juvenile Court Judge, Endorsed Democrat."  

On a recent expedition down Marlboro Street in Sandusky, where she lives, Beverly Newell Hancock was quick to tout her values and explain what she'd bring to the table if elected juvenile court judge.

She wants to curb gang violence, for instance, and she'd like to limit the amount of time juveniles spend in jail prior to their conviction.

She faces incumbent juvenile court Judge Robert DeLamatre, a Republican, at the polls Nov. 6.

There's not much difference in Hancock's political signs and DeLamatre's signs.

In one noticeable respect, however, Hancock is quite different not just from DeLamatre, but all the other candidates running for a contested political office in Erie County this fall.

Hancock is the only black candidate in the bunch.

Nine other white hopefuls — incumbents and newcomers alike — are running for various offices, including two county commissioner seats, the treasurer's spot and the judge's spot.

The shortage of black candidates is disproportionate to Erie County's black population, U.S. Census data shows.

About 9 percent of Erie County residents are black. That's roughly 6,700 of the county's 77,000 people, according to U.S. Census data.

If using the Census data as a measuring stick, about 1 in 10 of Erie County's elected officials should be black. The reality is only one of the county's 15 elected officials is black: clerk of courts Luvada Wilson.  

Voters never elected Wilson to her post. A judge appointed her to serve a 15-month term after her predecessor, Barb Johnson, died. Johnson was also black.  

Wilson is running unopposed Nov. 6, which guarantees at least one black person will serve in an Erie County office after Election Day.

The shortage of black political candidates is no surprise to Joel Lieske, a Cleveland State University political science professor.

"People tend to favor those who are most like themselves," Lieske said. "If a district contained a majority of non-white voters, white candidates would be disadvantaged."

Hancock said she realizes few blacks run for office in Erie County, but the notion hardly bothers her.

"I don't get up in the morning and say, 'I wish some black people were running so I could vote for them,'" she said. "But I would love to see more diversity in publicly elected offices."

She assumed, like many others, the election of U.S. President Barack Obama four years ago would inspire more blacks to run for public office.

While that hasn't happened in any major way, the country's minority population continues to make achievements elsewhere.

"We were always told as kids, 'You can be president of the United States,'" Hancock said. "A lot of black children may not have believed that — until Barack Obama came along. And now they believe."

Regardless of the outcome on Nov. 6, Hancock hopes to set an example for black residents in Erie County.

"Maybe I can inspire young girls and young boys to pursue their dreams, whether it's an attorney, for office or whatever dream they have," she said.

Total population                  Black population (percent)
Erie County  77,000              8.7
Ohio             11.5 million       12.4
U.S.              311 million        13.1
Source: U.S. Census



Julie R.

So were you confused over the LAW that I posted that pertained to that illegal court-ordered scam sheriff sale of my deceased mother and stepfather's property and the fraud preliminary judicial report that they used to do it?


Swamp Fox

Julie R you really are hopeless and it's pathetic that you can't understand the law. When Judge McGookey was last elected her position was.

"The judge of the court of common pleas of Erie county who is elected in 2008, and successors, is the successor to the judge of the probate division of that court whose term expires on February 8, 2009, shall be designated as a judge of the court of common pleas, general division, shall have all the powers relating to the general division of the court of common pleas of Erie County", the other judges did not appoint her the change in stature did, but that understanding must have escaped you do to lack of comprehension.

I don't expect you to understand facts and logic because in the end you always make it about your own fantasy issues and self absorbed obsession.....

Julie R.

Once again, in the majority of Ohio's 88 counties, the juvenile court judge also serves as the probate court judge. The law also says that the only time a common pleas court judge can handle anything in probate is only if the probate court judge is unavoidably absent. So how is little one-horse Erie County getting away with this crap? Sort of like the probate court sealing records in the estates of your prosecutor's parents. Call up any title company around and ask if they would ever give out title insurance if they're prohibited from searching matter of public records in probate.

Swamp Fox

My suggestion is to have someone read you section 2101.023 of the ORC very slowly maybe even drawing you pictures, but I caution you even then you will remain DISINHERITED... Once again this article is about minorities not holding public office and not about your fantasies...

Julie R.

I have 7 depositions that the Eeerie County courts and a bunch of snake attorneys tried to illegally conceal. The depositions all have the heading of the Erie County Probate Court with the name of a sitting Cuyahoga County judge named Carolyn Freidland. So considering that you're trying to say that the state of Ohio said Tone and Binette can also serve as probate court judges, did the state of Ohio also say a Cuyahoga County judge can serve as an Erie County probate court judge?

Julie R.

@Swamp Fox: I can read and understand the laws. It's really not that difficult. Take for example the law that your joke courts and their attorney buds had to follow prior to that scam illegal court-ordered sheriff sale of my deceased mother and stepfather's property that had serious defects in the title caused by the auditor Jude Hammond authorizing those sneaky attorneys and those two fraud power of attorneys from Huron to fraudulently transfer my mother's half seven months before her death so the morons could then defraud her 4th beneficiary on a new fraud TOD Deed.

The law they had to follow was O.R.C.5309.61 that says in any suit or proceeding in any of the courts of record in this state in which registered land may be partitioned or sold by the orders or judgement of the court, no confirmation of such partition, sale, or transfer shall be made by the court until there is first filed in the case a report of an examiner of titles, showing that all persons necessary to such suit or proceedings have been made parties and properly brought before the court and that the proceedings and sale have in all respects been regular and pursuant to the law.

Now take note that they got around that law by paying the Sandusky abstract title company that did the title search (i.e. the examiner of titles) to falsely state in the (fraud) preliminary judicial report that there were no defects in the title. It's why the title company -- after an employee gave it away all the fraud they found on the property -- had to rush out and get this attorney Beverly Newell Hancock so Binette could quash the subponea that requested a copy of the title search report they did prior to that scam illegal court-ordered sheriff sale.


Interestingly, we just recently received some relevant information regarding Attorney Beverly Newell. Based upon the following set of facts it appears as though Beverly Newell intentionally railroaded her former client, Krista Harris, so that she could ensure her family members were given sweeeeet deals by Kevin Baxter's office. Ms. Newell apparently was representing her nephew,Damon Newell in a criminal case where he was facing 40 plus years in prison. Needless to say, no special prosecutor was required, although, Damon Newell is the son of Sandusky Police Officer Lonnie Newell. Moreover, Damon Newell was given judicial release after he admitted to kidnapping and raping a woman.
Now, for those of you out there that have a problem with the truth I've provided you with a copy of court of appeals decision regarding this matter.

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. E-08-067
Appellee Trial Court No. 2003-CR-494
Appellant Decided: July 31, 2009
* * * * *
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Mary Ann Barylski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Beverly Newell Hancock, for appellant.
* * * * *
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court of Common
Pleas. On December 17, 2004, appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
four years each on one count of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03, a felony of
the third degree, and on one count of abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02, a felony of
the third degree. On November 7, 2006, the trial court granted appellant's motion for
judicial release and placed appellant on community control subject to certain conditions.
{¶ 2} On May 23, 2008, the trial court determined that appellant was in violation
of the court ordered community control. On August 28, 2008, the trial court revoked
appellant's community control sentence and reinstated the original sentence.
{¶ 3} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following sole assignment of error:
{¶ 6} Under Ohio law, it is well-settled that "[a]n appellate court reviews the trial
court's decision to revoke community control [under] an abuse-of-discretion standard."
State v. Toler, 154 Ohio App.3d 590, 2003-Ohio-5129, ¶ 5. "An abuse of discretion
indicates [that the court's] decision * * * is unreasonable arbitrary or unconscionable."
Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
{¶ 7} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On
November 14, 2003, the grand jury issued an indictment against appellant on two counts
of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), felonies of the first degree, and two
counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), felonies of the first degree.
{¶ 8} On August 4, 2004, pursuant to a voluntarily negotiated plea agreement,
appellant pled guilty to one amended count of abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02, a
felony of the third degree, and one amended count of sexual battery, in violation of R.C.
2907.03, a felony of the third degree. In exchange, the remaining two counts were
dismissed nolle prosequi.
{¶ 9} On December 17, 2004, the trial court sentenced appellant to concurrent
terms of incarceration of four years on each count. In addition, pursuant to R.C.
2950.09(B)(2), the trial court found appellant to be a sexually oriented offender.
{¶ 10} On December 17, 2004, in companion case No. 2004-CR-238, the trial
determined that appellant had been found guilty on one count of trafficking in cocaine, in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(4)(b), a felony of the fourth degree. The trial
court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 12 months, to be run concurrently with the
sentences imposed by the trial court in case No. 2003-CR-494.
{¶ 11} On January 31, 2005, appellant filed an appeal of the sentencing. On
June 3, 2005, this court consolidated, based on a finding of common questions of law and
fact, case Nos. 2003-CR-494 and 2004-CR-238. On April 21, 2006, this court affirmed
appellant's convictions, finding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
sentencing appellant, pursuant to the relevant statutory sentencing provisions. State v.
Boyd, 6th Dist. Nos. E-05-007, E-05-008, 2006-Ohio-1990.
{¶ 12} On September 15, 2006, appellant filed a motion for judicial release. On
November 7, 2006, the trial court ordered that appellant be placed on community control,
subject to conditions, for a period of five years.
{¶ 13} On June 26, 2007, the trial court determined that appellant was in violation
of the terms and conditions of the community control. Specifically, as appellant himself
conceded, the violations consisted of failing to attend the mandatory sex offender
treatment program and appellant being charged with new offenses.
{¶ 14} On August 23, 2007, the trial court determined that these violations did not
necessitate termination of the community control. The trial court reinstated the same
terms and conditions that had been previously imposed upon appellant. In addition, the
trial court imposed a condition requiring that appellant successfully complete any
program, including after care, recommended by the counselors at Firelands Counseling
and Recovery Services ("Firelands").
{¶ 15} On May 23, 2008, the trial court again found appellant to be in violation of
the terms and conditions of the community control sentence. On August 28, 2008, the
trial court revoked appellant's community control sanction. As a result, in reinstating the
original sentence, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of four years for abduction,
in violation of R.C. 2905.02, a felony of the third degree, and to a term of four years for
sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03, a felony of the third degree. In imposing this
sentence, the trial court ordered that the prison terms be served concurrently and credited
appellant for time served as of August 28, 2008. It is from this judgment that appellant
now appeals.
{¶ 16} In the sole assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court
imposed unreasonable community control requirements upon him. Appellant asserts that
his termination from the treatment program for failing to comply with the program's
mandatory requirements constituted an unreasonable discharge.
{¶ 17} Under Ohio law, pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), when a sentencing court
imposes a community control sanction "[t]he court shall notify the offender that, if the
conditions of the sanction are violated, [or] if the offender commits a violation of any law
* * * the court * * * may impose a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term
on the offender * * *." Furthermore, it is well-settled that when "determining whether a
condition of [community control] is related to the 'interests of doing justice, rehabilitating
the offender, and insuring his good behavior,' courts should consider whether the
condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship
to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is
criminal or reasonably related to future criminality * * *." State v. Jones (1990), 49 Ohio
St.3d 51, 53. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that this standard
"stands for the proposition that [community control] conditions must be reasonably
related to the statutory ends * * * and must not be overbroad." State v. Talty, 103 Ohio
St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 16.
{¶ 18} Appellant argues that the requirements imposed by Firelands, of taking a
polygraph test and being truthful with the counselors concerning unprotected sex, should
be construed as unreasonable conditions of community control. However, appellant fails
to distinguish between the conditions of community control imposed by the court and the
requirements of the Firelands sex offender treatment program.
{¶ 19} This court has carefully reviewed the record. The record indicates that the
trial court properly considered the purposes of sentencing, pursuant to R.C. 2929.11, and
properly balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors, under R.C. 2929.12. Most
significantly, the record shows that the trial court explicitly conditioned appellant's
community control sentence on his compliance with the program recommended by the
Firelands' counselors. The record clearly demonstrates that appellant failed to comply
with the Firelands' requirements that appellant take a polygraph test and deal truthfully
with the counselors concerning unprotected sex.
{¶ 20} In light of the above stated legal principles, the record shows that the
community control conditions imposed by the trial court were reasonably related to
treatment of a sexually oriented offender. As a result, this court cannot say that the trial
court imposed conditions upon appellant unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably.
On the contrary, the trial court acted pursuant to clear legal authority and therefore did
not abuse its discretion in conditioning appellant's community control sentence on
appellant's completion of the Firelands' program. Appellant's sole assignment of error is
found not well-taken.
{¶ 21} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Erie County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See,
also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Peter M. Handwork, J. _______________________________
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
John R. Willamowski, J. JUDGE
Judge John R. Willamowski, Third District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio's Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court's web site at:

Julie R.

West: If it's any consolation, I think just about everybody around knows that Krista Harris got railroaded and why. I for one say a prayer everyday that karma comes around full circle and gets every single one of the dirt-bags --- and I truly believe it will sooner or later.